Miles Nurse
Vancouver Film School, 2014 to 2015

Every program saw itself in the same picture. The money went where the margin was.

In 2014 the school asked me to move from running the Digital Design program to a new role across all of it: innovation and user experience. Revenue had fallen by almost a fifth in eighteen months. The brief, as it arrived, was a new website.

The website did need replacing. It had been built in 2000, patched twice since, and had grown past four hundred pages. People used the home page as a reset button. Admissions advisors spent hours on the phone walking applicants through it, and when we asked students what had made up their minds, they named the advisor, not the site.

Every program had its own explanation for the fall. None of them had the same numbers.

There were thirteen programs, and they were not alike. Writing needs writers and a room. Digital Design needed computers that doubled as a render farm. Some programs were small and some were broad, and each saw the school through its own enrolment. Marketing was measured on leads and admissions on students, and their two systems did not even call an applicant by the same name.

So before the site, we built one picture: for every program, what we spent to find students, what came back, how much we discounted, and which classes were filling for the next intake.

THIRTEEN PROGRAMS, ONE PICTURESix of the thirteen, drawn to show the mechanism. The bars are not the school's numbers.PROGRAMSEATS FILLED FOR THE NEXT INTAKEMARGIN PER SEATFILM PRODUCTION3D ANIMATIONGAME DESIGNACTINGMAKEUP DESIGNWRITINGBREAK-EVENthe next dollar goes hereLEADSMORE SPENDexpectedit never bentOnce every program sat in the same picture, the question stopped being how much and became where.
The programs are real; the bars are not the school's numbers. The inset is the shape of what we found, not a chart of it.

The picture overturned my own plan.

My plan for the year said we leaned too hard on paid search and needed to depend on it less. The numbers said otherwise. As we spent more on digital advertising, each dollar kept bringing back about what the last one had. We never found the point where it stopped paying.

That changed the question leadership was asking. It stopped being how much to spend and became where. The obvious answer was the empty seats. The picture said otherwise: every program had its own break-even, set by its costs, its discounting and its mix of international and domestic students, so a seat in one program was worth more than a seat in another. Animation and Film were close to full and still the best place for the next dollar. The picture also showed where enrolment was too low to give a class the year it was promised. Delaying an intake was rare, and kept for a program whose graduates struggled to find work. More often the answer came earlier: applicants who did not yet meet the entry requirements were recommended the foundation program first, and many went on to a second program. A lot of them came to Digital Design.

Digital Design was the clearest case. It lost money before I ran it and made its first profit while I did. The math was simple once it was visible: 24 students an intake, three intakes a year, international students paying $42,000 and domestic $27,000 each. At an even split, the program made money. Its students also made the widest range of work in the school, and that work became the school's best marketing, bringing in leads nobody paid for.

DIGITAL DESIGN, ONE INTAKE24 students, three intakes a year. Tuition per student at the time, international and domestic.12 INTERNATIONAL$42,000 each12 DOMESTIC$27,000 eachan even split:profitableTHREE INTAKES A YEARthe students' workthe school's marketingleads nobody paid forAt an even split, the program made money.
Tuition is from the time. The seats are the intake as it ran; the rest is the mechanism.

Each of these needed the others.

A voice for every program. The brand work ran through the heads of the thirteen programs. They described what the year was really like, and that became how the school described itself. Outside, the line stayed Results Matter, with the promise that students leave with the confidence to author their own careers. Inside, we were honest that too many students were surviving the year rather than thriving in it, and that gap became the brief for everything else.

One record of every applicant. A new CRM, Microsoft Dynamics, so marketing and admissions were looking at the same person.

A site that does the advisor's first hour. From over four hundred pages to about thirty-five, planned around search from the start, with every path ending in a conversation with an advisor. Applicants found the answers themselves, and advisors spent their time with the people ready to decide.

A new market. When the school opened a campus in Shanghai, I led the brand strategy and helped with the marketing and curriculum choices. International scholarship campaigns ran alongside it.

None of it worked alone. The math, the process, the site, the brand and the Shanghai campus together made a growth machine: the next dollar went where it earned the most, and leadership could see where a class was too small to give students the year they came for.

Over the next year, applicants converted 27% more often, and calls to advisors fell 49%, because people could find answers themselves. Traffic grew 62% across paid and organic search, enrolment rose 25%, and revenue rose 18% year over year. By the time I moved on, revenue was back to where it had been before the fall.

It had a cost. Every page we cut was something a program had asked for, and once every program could see every other one, some conversations got harder before they got better. The site was carried by our consumer-insight lead and a small team we ran like a start-up inside the school. The brand belonged as much to the heads of department as to me.

The argument changes when everyone is looking at the same picture.

Forty-five minutes. Tell me what is on your mind.
No invoice for that part · miles@remarkable.work